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BOOK REVIEW
TOWARD GENDER EQUALITY: THE PROMISE OF
PARADOXES OF GENDER TO PROMOTE STRUCTURAL
CHANGE
PARADOXES OF GENDER, by Judith Lorber,* New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1994.
Reviewed by Andrea Giampetro-Meyer**
and Amy Fiordalisi***
One of the joys of reading is that studying the words of
thoughtful, knowledgeable writers helps readers rethink the way
they look at the world. Those of us who read, reason, and practice
in the field of law sometimes need to experience the jolt one can
feel by reading literature outside the field of law. Judith Lorber
presents ideas in Paradoxes of Gender' that trigger a significant
jolt. In this book, sociologist Lorber urges the reader to see the
world in a new way. In particular, she asks the reader to view
gender as a social institution. Lorber sees "gender as an insti-
tution that establishes patterns of expectations for individuals,
orders the social processes of everyday life, is built into the
major social organizations of society, such as the economy, ide-
ology, the family, and politics, and is also an entity in and of
itself. '2 She draws from research on the social aspects of gender
from a wide range of fields to support her goal of questioning
the naturalness and inevitability of gender as an institution.
Lorber aims to expose the institution of gender so it can then
be dismantled.
The purpose of this article is to consider the promise of social
science literature, including books such as Paradoxes of Gender,
to help women achieve equality. Section I presents a detailed
review of Paradoxes of Gender. This section is important because
it helps the reader see the kinds of information available in fields
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1. JUDiTH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER (1994).
2. Id. at 1.
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outside law that could promote change through and within the
legal system. Section II shows how social science literature can
help us rethink the way we look at legal issues. This section
focuses on three legal issues-domestic violence, rape, and com-
parable worth-and shows how Lorber's book and other social
science information can affect our views of these areas of law.
The article concludes by pondering the effect of requiring judges
and lawyers to read books such as Paradoxes of Gender. This
article proposes that judges and lawyers can and should learn
from the social sciences, but also that most judges and many
lawyers would be reluctant to do so.
I. PARADOXES OF GENDER: A CHALLENGE TO OUR MOST BASIC
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT GENDER
Lawyers and judges often are reluctant to look outside the
field of law for answers to compelling social questions. If asked
how women can achieve equality, most judges and lawyers would
look to past cases that focused on gender discrimination issues
and to statutes that aim to combat gender discrimination. After
a review of cases and statutes, debates by those in the legal field
who care about eliminating gender inequality would likely focus
on the relative effectiveness of judicial and legislative decision
making to promote such change. Footnotes would be extensive
and exhaustive, yet would probably not include references to
sources other than cases, statutes, and law review articles-
which cite cases, statutes, and more law review articles.
What a surprise it is, then, when lawyers look outside their
discipline to see the approach other scholars take to answering
compelling social questions. In Paradoxes of Gender, Judith Lorber
challenges our most basic assumptions about gender. Like a legal
scholar, she is thorough. Her bibliography is long; her notes are
thick. Unlike a legal scholar, however, Lorber challenges our
most basic assumptions about gender by "drawling] on research
on the social aspects of gender from anthropology, history, soci-
ology, social psychology, sociolinguistics, men's studies, and cul-
ture studies." She attempts to transform these pieces "into a
coherent picture of gender as a process of social construction, a
system of social stratification, and an institution that structures
every aspect of our lives because it is embedded in the family,
the workplace, and the state, as well as in sexuality, language,
3. Id. at 5.
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and culture." 4 Lorber aims to present a coherent picture of gender
as a social institution in order to facilitate its eventual disman-
tling.6
Lorber argues that "the whole point of gendering is to produce
structured gender inequality.... The subordination of women
persists because it produces a group that can be exploited as
workers, sexual partners, childbearers, and emotional nurturers
in the marketplace and in the household."6 She calls into question
the gender system's "naturalness and inevitability." 7 Ultimately,
Lorber would like to see "a society without economic inequities,
racial distinctions, or sexual exploitation .... "s,
Lorber titled her book Paradoxes of Gender because she be-
lieves that "much of what we take for granted about gender and
its causes and effects either does not hold up or can be explained
differently."9 Lorber asserts, for instance, that gender grouping
has become so standard and universal that society tends to
believe feminine and masculine traits are due to genetic or
physiological differences. 0 She cites a women's ability to bear
children as one paradox of gender." She explains that men have
created the notion that women's birth giving is a reason for their
subordination, when in actuality females, because of their child-
bearing ability, have an advantage over males. The ability to
bring into life another human being is a "potential source of
power unmatched in modern times by any physical advantages
men have."12 Lorber maintains that in most civilized cultures
when people have physical disadvantages they are given varying
degrees of compensation to make up for their disabilities. Lorber
adopts the argument that in our culture, however, "men ... have
received compensation in the form of social customs that give
4. Id. Many judges and legal scholars have pointed out that discrimination is en-
trenched in institutions, including American legal institutions. See, e.g., Deborah Ruble
Round, Gender Bias in the Judicial System 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2193 (1988).
5. LORBER, supra note 1, at 10.
6. Id. at 292-93. For legal scholars' opinions consistent with Lorber's, see DEBORAH
L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81
(1987).
7. LORBER, supra. note 1, at 5.
8. Id. at 293.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id. at 6
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing Sandra Schwartz Tangri, A Feminist Perspective on Some Ethical Issues
in Population Programs, 1 SIGNS 895. 896 (1976)).
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them power over the able-that is, over women's bodies-and
fertility."13
Lorber presents a lengthy list of the many "paradoxes of
gender" that permeate and envelop our everyday lives.14 She
examines and questions gender norms our world has created.16
She asks, for instance, why women are expected to be the primary
child rearers and parents even when both parents work. She
blames this paradox on the effects of gendered parenting, which
13. Id. (citing Tangri, supra note 12).
14. In the first part of her book, Lorber examines the following paradoxes:
Why does gender simultaneously construct difference and sameness?
Why are the phenomena of bodily experiences gendered?
Why, given the variety of sexual behaviors and relationships, do we speak
of only two opposite sexes?
Why don't transvestites, transsexuals, hermaphrodites, and the institu-
tionalized third genders in some societies affect the conceptualization of two
genders and two sexes?
Why are most of our cultural images of women the way men see them,
not the way women see themselves?
Id. at 7-8.
In part two, Lorber asks:
Why was inequality of women and men the consequence of human's
invention of gender when originally the gendered division of labor was a
means of cooperatively expanding the food supply and ensuring the survival
of children?
Why are all women expected to have children and care for them in modern
society? How does this responsibility co-opt women into a system of ine-
quality?
Why is domestic work the wife's responsibility in modern societies even
when she earns more than half the family income?
Id. at 8.
In the third and final section of her book, Lorber asks:
Why does gendered segregation of jobs and lower compensation of work
done by women persist throughout industrialized economies despite the
enormous variety of types of work and work skills?
Why, when women can be found in substantial numbers in many occupa-
tions and professions, are there so few women in positions of authority in
modern industrialized societies?
Why do societies established for equality (including, in some revolutionary
cases, gender equality) still exhibit substantial and systematic gender ine-
quality?
Why, since gender is socially constructed, is it so difficult to eradicate or
even minimize?
Id.
15. Lorber focuses on a particular paradox in each chapter. In the first part of her
book, Lorber discusses the various components of gender, including socialization, biology,
sexuality, and cultural images. In the second part of her book, she examines gender in
practice by evaluating the social evolution of gender, gendered parenting, gender and
domestic labor, and the division of paid work. Finally, Lorber analyzes the politics of
gender and discusses the micropolitics of gender, gender and the state, and gender and
equality. Id. at vii, viii.
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are that females throughout their lives "are psychologically co-
opted into wanting to be good mothers, and both the competence
and the feelings become a significant part of being a 'good
woman."' 6 Lorber believes, however, that men as well as women
could and would be good mothers. She argues that "the phenom-
enon we call mothering is a learned experience, and the doing of
it by anyone develops skills, competence, and emotional relation-
ships." 7
Lorber looks further into the paradoxes of gender in her
chapter called "Guarding the Gates: The Micropolitics of Gen-
der."'8 This chapter is one of the best in the book. In this chapter,
she examines why in the last decade women numbered between
42.4/o and 45.4/o of the work force, yet only five women were
heads of the largest corporations.'9 The belief that upward mo-
bility and leadership positions would increase among women as
they entered the work force "greatly underestimated the social
processes that get some people onto the fast track and syste-
matically derail others."20 Through networking, mentoring, spon-
sorship, and social practices, men have managed to keep the
majority of women in middle-management positions. Most women
in these positions remain underpaid and are unable to assist their
female coworkers progress up the corporate ladder.21
In each chapter, Lorber helps us understand why these para-
doxes of gender exist and how they have become entrenched in
our everyday lives. Her message is that gender is a "human
invention, like language, kinship, religion, and technology; like
them, gender organizes human social life in culturally patterned
ways."22 She believes we have the ability to change society's
16. Id. at 169. For a particularly good discussion from the legal community about
women as mothers, see West, supra note 6. West asserts that "[olur reproductive role
renders us non-autonomous .... Emotionally and morally women may benefit from the
dependency of the fetus and the infant upon us. But materially we are more often
burdened than enriched by that dependency." Id. at 140.
17. LORBER, supra note 1, at 168.
18. Id. at 225.
19. Id. (citing Barbara Marsh, Women in the Work Force, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1991,
at B3). Most female employees remain in "relatively low-status, low-paying, female-
dominated vocations." RHODE, supra note 6, at 161.
20. LORBER, supra note 1, at 226.
21. Id. Women in the legal community have experienced the derailment Lorber
describes. Studies in numerous states on gender bias in the courts have noted that
women who work in the legal community are often shut out of the network men enjoy.
See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Studying Gender Bias in the Courts: Stories and Statistics,
45 STAN. L. REv. 2187, 2189 (1993) ("There is a general aura of a 'good old boys' network
from which women are excluded .... ) (citing to a letter from a female practitioner).
22. LORBER, supra note 1, at 6.
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perceptions of gender and, in doing so, to create a more just and
fair world in which ability and worth would *not be judged by
sex or color, and opportunity would be available to all.? In
discussing the numerous paradoxes of gender, Lorber attempts
to contribute to the cause of changing the status quo. She
promotes "real change" that would eventually result in a "reor-
dering of the organizing principles of social life ... with aware-
ness of hidden assumptions ... and latent effects ... ."24 She
wants her reader to see gender in a new way so that structural
change to promote gender equality will take place. Right now,
the whole point of gender is to maintain gender inequality. Lorber
wants to change our view of gender in the hope of promoting
equality.
II. THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE LITERATURE TO
LEGAL ISSUES
This section focuses on three legal issues-domestic violence,
rape, and comparable worth-and illustrates how Paradoxes of
Gender and other works in the social sciences can affect the law.
This section shows both the promise and shortcomings of social
science literature as a potential contributor to legal issues. The
first two legal issues, domestic violence and rape, were chosen
because judicial bias has affected these areas of law so clearly.
Lorber's work helps us increase our understanding of judicial
bias and media reactions to bias. Comparable worth was chosen
for a different reason. This legal theory demonstrates the diffi-
culty of trying to promote structural change through an individ-
ualistic legal system. By reviewing the comparable worth theory
and the legal system's response to it, we can see that judges
would be reluctant to take seriously the idea that any institution
(including gender as a social institution) can and should be dis-
mantled.
A. Judicial Bias, Domestic Violence, and Rape
Lorber's perspectives on domestic violence, or "battered love,"
and rape shed light on how actors in the legal system respond
23. See id.
24. Id. at 10.
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to these issues.2 She explains her views on domestic violence
and rape in a chapter titled "How Many Opposites? Gendered
Sexuality." In this chapter, Lorber presents ideas about battered
love. She says that men who physically abuse their spouses
usually do so because society associates masculinity with norms
of dominance. 2 Men who do not have the economic status to
enforce a dominant stance tend to be psychologically or physically
abusive toward their mates.P Women who stay in abusive rela-
tionships are often socialized into believing that they must emo-
tionally support their husbands.- Because of economic constraints,
or fear of what their spouses would do if they tried to leave,
abused women often see no way out of abusive relationships.2
Lorber points out correctly that "[w]ife beating was once ap-
proved in most communities and is still condoned today where
there is an ideology of men's authority over their wives."3 She
also draws attention to the lackadaisical response of doctors,
nurses, and the police to battering, and suggests this response
reflects the idea that domestic violence is just part of life.31
In the same chapter, Lorber explores the link between mas-
culinity and rape. She explains that sex crimes against women
"are almost mythic metaphors for men's dominance and women's
submission."32 She also points out that rape is so common that
often "it takes a particularly brutal gang rape to make head-
lines."33 In addition, she notes how difficult it is for our society
to consider date rape "real" rape4 even though in fifty-two
percent of the completed rapes of women and girls, the offender
25. Id. at 55; see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 241-44 (discussing and explaining
battered wife syndrome). See generally Matthew Litsky, Note, Explaining the Legal
System's Inadequate Response to the Abuse of Women: A Lack of Coordination, 8 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 149 (1990) (presenting a thorough discussion of justifications for police
non-enforcement in wife abuse cases, and proposing ideas for how the legal system could
do a better job of ending spousal abuse).
26. LORBER. supra note 1, at 71.
27. Id. (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WIFE SYNDROME (1984); Kersti Y116,
The Status of Women, Marital Equality, and Violence Against Wives, 5 J. FAM. ISSUES
307-30 (1984)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 71-72.
30. Id. at 73.
31. Id. See Litsky, supra note 25 (providing additional information on the lackadaisical
attitude of actors in the legal system).
32. LOBBER, supra note 1, at 75. See RHODE, supra, note 6, and West, supra note 6 for
discussions of rape from feminist legal theorists.
33. LORBER, supra note 1, at 75.
34. Id. (citing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987)).
1994]
138 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 1:131
was an intimate of the victim35 In all types of rape, Lorber sees
a link between the crime and masculinity. She explains that
generally, men who rape feel "that women should be sexually
faithful and men should be tough, fearless, and determining what
sexualities will have moral hegemony."3 6
Lorber's views on domestic violence and rape help us see
judicial bias and its impact on domestic violence and rape cases
from a new perspective. This section will first summarize judicial
bias and its impact on domestic violence and rape cases, then it
will explain how Lorber's work helps increase our understanding
of judicial bias in rape and domestic violence cases. This section
incorporates examples from an article titled America's Most Sexist
Judges from a popular women's magazine. 37 The section illustrates
that although the most outrageous comments judges make may
often trigger emotional responses, these comments are not sur-
prising in a culture in which gender is a social institution that
perpetuates inequality.
Many people believe that judges are unbiased and impartial
mediators.3s Their decisions affect the lives of many and it is
critical that they are able to maintain at least the appearance
that their opinions are free from obvious value assumptions.
Judges cannot be impartial, however, when they harbor tradi-
tional stereotypes and attitudes towards women. These damaging
attitudes appear in their courtrooms and in their rulings. Because
most judges are male,3 9 they may hear evidence about women's
experiences but fail to understand the experiences. 0 They may
35. Id. (citing CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF
VIOLENT CRIME 7 (1991)).
36. Id; see also West, supra note 6, at 809. West writes that "[t]hose in power ignore
women's suffering because they don't care about the suffering of the disempowered.
Hierarchical power imbalances do that to people-they make the disempowered less than
human, and they make the empowered ruthless." Id. West describes the radical feminist's
strategy to solve this problem: "[Wihat we must do is dismantle the hierarchy." Id.
37. Sheila Weller, America's Most Sexist Judges, REDHOOK, Feb. 1994, at 83.
38. Numerous cases have asserted the importance of the judge as a neutral ruler.
See, e.g., In re Mussman, 302 A.2d 822, 824 (N.H. 1973) ("[L]itigants and the public have
a right to a court free from the shadow of unfitness. 'It is the right of every citizen to
be tried by judges as impartial as the lot of humanity will admit."') (quoting N.H. CONST.
pt. I, art. 35).
39. When Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was appointed to the Supreme Court, only
5.4% of all federal judges were women and of more than 20,000 judicial positions only
900, or 4.5%, were held by women. ESCHEL M. RHOODIE, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN:
A GLOBAL SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC, EDUCATIONAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF
WOMEN 288 (1989).
40. Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bia in the Courts. Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3 (1990).
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be unable to see past their own stereotypes about women and
men.41 Male judges also may be unable to accord the same
credibility to a woman's testimony as they would to a man's.4 2
When critics of the legal system point out the lack of gender
diversity on the bench, they imply that older, male judges could
have difficulty understanding and appreciating a women's point
of view.43 The severity of the domestic violence problem in
American society demonstrates how these sociological differences
can lead to grave consequences. 44 Many laws pertaining to do-
mestic violence are burdened by traditional constraints and re-
flect a lack of understanding of economic and social obstacles
that women face. s Most of these laws, not coincidentally, were
written by legislatures that are dominated by men.
Unfortunately, it is in our courtrooms that women suffer some
of the most damaging effects of traditional constraints and prej-
udices. Judges, like members of the general public, may accept
the many myths about domestic violence. 46 For instance, "many
judges believe that battered women are masochists or that they
exaggerate the seriousness of the violence they suffer to punish
'philandering husbands or boyfriends."' 47 Additionally, many judges
respect family privacy to such a great extent that they fail to
protect domestic violence victims. In one case, for example, a
judge chided a battery victim for washing her "dirty linen in
public." 48
Judges who take their biased attitudes into the courtroom
have the power to destroy lives and break up families. For
instance, in a custody battle, Judge Jerry Carr Whitehead, age
fifty-nine, of the Second District Court in Reno, Nevada, took
one woman's son away from her after a court-appointed psychol-
ogist met and evaluated only her ex-husband. 4 9 In domestic vio-
lence cases, judges often let husbands get away with injuring
their wives simply because the couple is married. For example,
41. Id.
42. Id. at 3-4.
43. See id.
44. "In any given year ... 10 to 20 percent of American women are beaten by a man
with whom they are intimately involved .... About one-third of all female homicide
victims are killed by a male friend or family member ... RHODE, suprm note 6, at 237.
"45. See gmeeraUy Litsky, supra note 25 (delineating the numerous inadequacies of laws
that aim to protect women from domestic violence).
46. Id. at 169.
47. Id. at 169-70.
48. Id. at 170.
49. Weller, supra note 37, at 84.
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Judge William J. O'Neil, age sixty-four, of Carroll County Supe-
rior Court in New Hampshire, sentenced Stephen Sarno to a
mere twenty-eight days (to be served over consecutive weekends)
for beating Susan Sarno, from whom he had been separated for
a year. Stephen Sarno stalked his wife on a camping trip and
beat her with a flashlight when he found her in bed with another
man. Judge O'Neil stated, "I can't conclude that [the attack] was
completely unprovoked. I think that would provoke the average
man."8 0 The judge did admit the attack went too far. He told the
wife, "to have slapped you might have been more normal."',1 The
judge's superior later apologized publicly to Susan Sarno for the
"insensitivity" she experienced in court
Although rape is probably one of the single most devastating
crimes a woman could experience, rape victims often are treated
with disdain and insensitivity in the courtroom.5 Judges and jury
members, like much of American society, hold views biased by
stereotypical attitudes and traditional thinking. As Lorber points
out in Paradoxes of Gender, rape is a crime burdened by tradi-
tional and societal beliefs that stress male dominance and female
submissiveness." The attitudes are often expressed in legal pro-
ceedings. Victims often must prove that they were forcibly raped
and refused to consent. Victims who fail to fight their attackers
are encouraged to believe that they have not been really raped,
or that they ought to have prevented it. Women who believe
that struggling with an assailant is likely to trigger further
physical injuries end up facing an unsympathetic legal system,
which has laws and attitudes that respect women who fight
back.P5
Rape is an especially sensitive subject. It is a traumatic ex-
perience for a woman and is only worsened by society's negative
attitudes and bias towards rape victims.M Judges often cannot
understand or relate to the victim's pain, or they tend to minimize
the seriousness of the crime. For instance, Judge Thomas Bollin-
ger, age fifty-two, of Baltimore County Circuit Court, granted
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See generally Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) (providing a thorough
discussion of courts' insensitivity to rape victims).
54. See LORBER, supra note 1, at 76-77.
55. See RHODE, supra note 6, at 247.
56. See generally Estrich, supra note 53 (discussing how sexism permeates attitudes
about rape).
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mere probation to a forty-four year-old man who was found guilty
of raping his eighteen year-old employee after she got drunk and
passed out on his bed.5 At the sentencing last April, Judge
Bollinger said the victim had "facilitated" the crime by getting
drunk, and he worried that criminalizing intercourse with a
sleeping woman might make many husbands rapists in the eyes
of the law.68 This type of bias is seen in courtrooms all over
America. 9 Many states have already initiated changes to address
the damaging attitudes that trigger incidents in which some
judges express extreme insensitivity to women.60 Many women's
groups have picketed courthouses 61 and national and local com-
mentators have written scathing articles about judicial bias in
order to promote change. 62
Social science literature is promising in terms of its ability to
promote change and reform. A review of Paradoxes of Gender
helps to increase one's understanding of why many judges lack
sensitivity in the issues of rape and domestic violence. It is
helpful yet distressing to read Lorber's account of how deep-
rooted attitudes and beliefs about gender can be. Reading Lor-
ber's book, however, makes it easier to understand why judges
sometimes make outrageous and sexist comments and decisions.
These judges are not villains. Instead, they are natural products
of a culture in which gender is a social institution that perpetu-
ates inequality. The few judges who say outrageous things-and
those who harbor the same appalling views but know better than
to utter sexist comments-are simply protectors of the status
57. Sheridan Lyons, Rapist Gets Probation, Judge's Pity, BALTIMORE SUN. Apr. 23,
1993, at IR.
58. See Weller, supra note 37, at 84.
59. Most states have conducted gender bias studies that outline comments made by
judges in specific cases. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging
Focus for Judicial Reform, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237, 246-51 (1989).
60. See Ruble Round, supra note 4, at 2197-2201.
61. In Baltimore, local women's groups picketed Judge Bollinger's courtroom until he
was required to take a rape sensitivity course. Larry Carson, Rape Sentence Protest,
BALTIMORE SUN, May 1, 1993, at 1B; Protesters Express Outrage at Judge, Refusal to Take
Rape Sensitivity Course is Cited, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 6, 1993, at 3B.
62. See, e.g., Bruce L. Bortz, The Bollinger Affair, BALTIMORE SUN, May 20, 1993, at
19A (suggesting that Baltimore County courts' reputation for hostility toward women is
well deserved); Ellen Goodman, Ms-Ogynists Have Their Day: The Envelopes, Please,
BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 24, 1993, at 11A (awarding Judge Bollinger the "Blind Justice
Award" for helping to set back the progress of women); Michael Olesker, Sexual Predators
Aided, Abetted by Wink and Leer, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 27, 1993, at 1B (wondering whether
Judge Bollinger would have reached the same decision had the rape victim been his own
daughter).
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quo. Their behavior is one small symptom of a much larger
structural problem.
The structural nature of the problem should affect our respon-
ses to judges' outrageous, ignorant comments. Persuading a judge
to read and appreciate Paradoxes of Gender seems more fruitful
than organizing women's rights groups to picket the courthouse
in which a particular judge practices his version of justice.
Picketing is an incremental solution to a structural problem that
requires more serious, long-term solutions. Reading Lorber's book
also encourages one to question the value of gathering outrageous
comments in articles with titles like America's Most Sexist Judges.
The problem is simply much larger than the comments made by
the few judges such articles highlight. In addition to writing and
reading such articles, people who care about equality should read
more social science literature. Interdisciplinary reading yields
new, more productive ideas about how to change societal insti-
tutions.
B. Comparable Worth
One of Lorber's strengths is her ability to get to the essence
of an issue quickly and to write a pithy section on an issue that
is complete and insightful. Her section on comparable worth6 is
a particularly strong one. This section is part of one of the most
important chapters in the book, titled "Separate and Not Equal:
The Gendered Division of Paid Work."64
In the pay equity or comparable worth section of the chapter,
Lorber defines comparable worth, gives good examples of pay
equity lawsuits that illustrate the theory, and provides important
evaluative comments about how various groups have imple-
mented comparable worth theory.65 She points out, for instance,
that under comparable worth evaluation systems, consultants
have had difficulty recognizing and rewarding human relations
63. LORBER, supra note 1, at 219-22.
64. Id. at 194-222. Comparable worth theory compares jobs held predominantly by
women with those held predominantly by men. The theory posits that employees should
be compensated equally for jobs that are equally complex, or that require similar skills
or responsibilities. Under this theory, evaluators assign points for different components
of a job-such as knowledge and skills, mental demands, and working conditions-and
then compare the total points of predominantly men's and predominantly women's jobs.
Jobs with equal total points should pay equal salaries. See id. at 219.
65. 1&L at 219-22.
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skills.66 As a result, employees who possess such skills, many of
whom are female, have their skills labeled "basic.."67 Lorber
explains, furthermore, that "[d]angerous or dirty working condi-
tions tend to be rewarded with extra points, but boredom from
routinized and heavily supervised work is not usually considered
an adverse working condition."68 As a result, assembly line and
data processing workers receive fewer points than construction
workers.6 9
Lorber points out the limited effectiveness of comparable worth
theory, which is rare for someone who is an advocate for in-
creased equality for women.70 She writes, "[diespite its purported
radical implications, the comparable worth strategy does not
restructure the economy, eliminate workplace hierarchies, flatten
out major wage differentials, or remove other forms of gender
inequities.71 She points out that it is unlikely that comparable
worth will eliminate occupational gender segregation and strati-
fication.72 Additionally, the theory "will not address hiring dis-
crimination based on the gender or race of the worker or inequities
in discretionary raises and promotion; these are affirmative action
issues."7 Finally, she points out that comparable worth theory
also fails to provide an unbiased assessment of job demands and
commensurate financial compensation.7 4 Lorber writes that
"[o]rganizational politics and the power of some groups ... de-
termine who benefits from comparable worth. 75 She states that
"comparable worth is hardly radical."76
Lorber supports her indictment of comparable worth with
social science studies and calls for action that is more radical
66. Id. at 220 (citing JOAN ACKER, DOING COMPARABLE WORTH: GENDER, CLASS, AND
PAY EQUITY (1989)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 219.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 220-21; see also Brigitte Berger, Comparable Worth at Odds with American
Realities, in 2 COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 26 (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights
ed., June 6-7. 1984) (arguing that comparable worth ignores the priority American women
place on taking care of their families and asserting that the criteria used to assess the
"worth" of jobs ensures that comparable worth will end up helping the women who least
need the help).
71. LORER, supra note 1, at 220.
72. Id. at 221.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 222 (citing Johanna Brenner, Feminist Political Discourses: Radical Versus
Liberal Approaches to the Feminization of Poverty and Comparable Worth, 4 GENDER &
Soc'Y 447-65 (1987)).
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than the disappointing implementation of comparable worth. Lor-
ber hopes for a world in which "all workers [are given] the
opportunity to do intrinsically and materially rewarding work
.... "17 This opportunity "would radically alter gender, class, and
race stratification in paid work."78
Lorber's section on pay equity or comparable worth focuses
on how this theory has not successfully altered gender, class,
and race stratification in paid work. Lorber places much of the
blame on those who implement comparable worth.7 9 This analysis
is important and is overlooked by most groups, except for con-
servative economists, who are relieved that comparable worth
has failed to achieve radical effects.80 Paradoxes of Gender, how-
ever, ignores the role courts have played in minimizing the
effectiveness of comparable worth.8' Judges have rejected com-
parable worth because it violates an institution most judges take
for granted-the market." Judges who have ruled in comparable
worth cases have demonstrated a desire to maintain institutions
(in this case the market), even if they are presented with evidence
that the institution often works in a discriminatory manner.83
Judges rarely see their role as one that allows them to consider,
evaluate, and/or dismantle institutions. Their focus on precedent
encourages cautious, incremental reform. 84 This fact triggers im-
portant questions about how judges and lawyers who read Par-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 221. Comparable worth decisions often are "shot through with subjectivity,
arbitrariness, and interest-group politics." Id. (citing William P. Bridges & Robert L.
N'elson, Organizational and Market Influences on Gender Inequality in a State Pay System,
95 AM. J. Soc. 616-58 (1989)); see also Peter F. Orazem & J. Peter Mattila, The Implemen-
tation Process of Comparable Worth: Winners and Losers, 98 J. POL. EcoN. 134 (1990);
Robert S. Smith, Comparable Worth: Limited Coverage and the Exacerbation of Inequality,
41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 227 (1988).
80. For an evaluation of comparable worth from a conservative perspective, see STEVEN
E. RHOADS, INCOMPARABLE WORTH: PAY EQUITY MEETS THE MARKET (1993).
81. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1207
(tracing the role courts have played in minimizing the effectiveness of comparable worth).
82. See M. Neil Browne & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, The Overriding Importance of
Market Characteristics for the Selection of Pay Equity Strategies: The Relative Efficacy of
Collective Bargaining and Litigation in the Nursing Industry, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 414
(1989) (analyzing market defense in comparable worth cases).
83. Id. at 428-32.
84. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881) ("The official
theory [of the development of law] is that each new decision follows syllogistically from
existing precedents.... [lit will be found that, when ancient rules maintain themselves
... new reasons more fitted to the time have been found for them, and that they gradually
receive a new content, and at last a new form .... ).
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adoxes of Gender would react to the book. For professionals whose
careers focus on the narrow, individualistic task of looking at the
case at hand and comparing it to past similar cases, the idea of
looking at legal issues from a world view that promotes structural
rather than incremental change is foreign. Lawyers and judges
who blindly follow the strict application of stare decisis would
be likely to view Lorber's book as irrelevant; Lorber does not
even mention cases or statutes.
A close examination of the book would alarm some lawyers
and judges. More than once, Lorbeir mentions Marxist ideas.85
She also supports changes that would have radical effects. 8 Her
thesis-that gender is a social institution that should be disman-
tled-is itself radical, and many would exaggerate and call it
subversive. Also, readers who fail to consider the whole book
and instead merely zero in on Lorber's view of utopia would have
difficulty taking her seriously. One reviewer (not from the legal
field) has called her view of utopia "nightmarish."8' Lorber's
utopia is the following:
In a world of scrupulous gender equality, equal numbers of
girls and boys would be educated and trained for the liberal
arts and for the sciences, for clerical and manual labor, and
for all the professions. Among those with equal credentials,
women and men would be hired ... to do women's types of
jobs and only women would be hired to do men's types of jobs
until half of every workforce was made up of men and half,
women.P
This statement alone could trigger scores of law review articles
by opponents of even the most modest affirmative action pro-
grams.8 9 Perhaps viewed alone Lorber's utopia looks unrealistic
(nightmarish seems strong) but in the context of a strong, com-
prehensive book this statement makes sense. Of course, this kind
of utopia threatens those who benefit most from the status quo-
those who already enjoy positions of power, wealth, and influ-
ence-many of whom are lawyers and judges. Which legal profes-
85. LORBER, supra note 1. at 266, 284-85.
86. See id. at 293 ("A truly radical goal for feminism would be not just gender equality
but ... a society without gender.").
87. Alan Wolfe, The Gender Question: Women and Men in the Mirror of Feminist
Theory, NEw REPUBLIC, June 6, 1994, at 32.
88. LORBER, supra note 1, at 298.
89. For an excellent refutation of arguments against affirmative action, see DAN
McGumE, A NEw AMERICAN JUSTICE (1980).
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sionals, then, might see Lorber's book as one that provides
valuable evidence toward promoting structural change? More
than one category of lawyers would appreciate Lorber's efforts.
First, those legal scholars who embrace the critical legal studies
movement would appreciate Lorber's work.90 Like Lorber, critical
legal studies scholars aim to dismantle discriminatory social in-
stitutions. They want to examine and deconstruct the legal sys-
tem and the way lawyers are trained in much the same way that
Lorber wants to deconstruct gender as a social institution. Crit-
ical legal studies scholars, like Lorber, first want to expose the
structural problems inherent in some institutions.9 1
Second, feminist critical theorists would be interested in the
information Lorber presents in Paradoxes of Gender.92 Feminist
critical theorists, sometimes referred to as "fem-crits," believe
that we will not be able to achieve gender equality under existing
ideological and institutional structures.93 Like critical legal studies
theorists, fem-crits challenge existing distributions of power. Un-
like critical legal studies theorists, fem-crits emphasize that "im-
portant aspects of mainstream legal doctrine and theory were
'developed with men's experience and interests in mind [and] are
incapable of adequately recognizing women's needs or incorpo-
rating women's experiences."' 94 These theorists believe that "sig-
nificant changes are needed in the law in order to promote
greater equality between the sexes."9 5
These views sound much like Lorber's, although the fem-crits
aim to deconstruct a different institution. Fem-crits want to
deconstruct the legal system and change ways law schools train
students; Lorber wants to deconstruct gender itself as a social
institution. Although the ultimate goal is different, it is with the
fem-crits that Lorber would enjoy the most acceptance and ap-
preciation within the legal system, given their shared perspective
that gender matters in a foundational way.
90. For thoughtful overviews of the critical legal studies movement, see Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The
Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988); Comment, The Schism Between
Minorities and the Critical Legal Studies Movement: Requiem for a Heavyweight?, 11 B.C.
THID WORLD L.J. 137 (1991).
91. See Menkel-Meadow, supra. note 90, at 66-71.
92. For excellent overviews of feminist critical legal theory, see Gregory Bassham,
Feminist Legal Theory: A Liberal Response, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 293
(1992); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990).
93. See Rhode, supra note 92.
94. Bassham, supra note 92, at 294 (citing WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 238 (1990)).
95. Id.
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Finally, legal scholars who promote gender equality, but who
do not necessarily follow the critical legal studies movement or
appreciate feminist jurisprudence, might find Lorber's ideas en-
lightening.9 Some scholars who push for equality for women may
be frightened by Lorber's insistence that change must be struc-
tural rather than incremental. Most lawyers, regardless of their
political tendencies, are taught to prefer incremental change.
Lorber's book provides information that supports such incremen-
tal change. For instance, an increased understanding of how
various groups have failed to successfully implement comparable
worth might help future consultants and lawyers to one day
implement comparable worth, even if they ignore Lorber's more
"radical" ideas.
III. CONCLUSION
Paradoxes of Gender reminds lawyers and judges of the impor-
tance of looking beyond the field of law for insight into social
issues that are played out in the legal arena. Issues rooted in
the fields of anthropology, history, sociology, social psychology,
sociolinguistics, men's studies, and culture studies often evoke
intense dramas in courtrooms, lawyers' offices, and judges' cham-
bers. Lorber's work is important. Although the book does not
provide "the answers" to questions about gender equality, it does
what a good book must do-presents valuable information that
could trigger new ways of looking at the world.
96. For examples of authors who favor increased equality for women, but are moderate
in their approach, see Mary A. Mason, Beyond Equal Opportunity: A New Vision for
Women Workers, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 393 (1992); Charlotte Rutherford,
African American Women and "Typically Female," Low-Wage Jobs: Is Litigation the
Answer?, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 211 (1992).
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